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THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE AS
ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATOR
JOHN R. STEELMAN* AND H. DEWAYNE KREAGERI
The Executive Office of the President is the formal title given to the President's
personal staff and personal staff agencies.1 Their purpose, of course, is to provide
assistance of the most intimate sort to the President in carrying out the responsi-
bilities of his office. Accordingly, the role of the Executive Office is determined by
the very nature of the President's job, and, always, by the personality and work
habits of the incumbent chief executive.
The President of the United States, in terms of his constitutional powers, plus
the accumulation of statutory authority vested in his office by a succession of Con-
gresses, is probably the most powerful single individual in the world today. And
when the President succeeds in marshalling the full power of his office, he is vir-
tually irresistible. Every President since the First World War, at one time or
another, has exercised the full measure of this power-legal and political. Similarly,
no President in that same period has been able to avoid completely the frustration
of being unable to bring that full power to bear on occasion in some crucial situation.
The President is two personalities. He is a private individual in his own right
who has few opportunities to exercise the privileges of privacy; and a public official
of superlative rank who simultaneously wears five executive hats, all of which label
him with power and none of which permit him privacy. He is at once the head of
the executive branch of the Government, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Services, the leader of his political party, the ceremonial head of the State, and his
country's decision-making spokesman in the critical do-or-die arena of world politics.
Since the subject of this discussion is the role of the Executive Office in relation-
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ship to the President's job as head of the executive branch of the Government, it is
important to note that, for all the symbols of power, real and psychological, and for
all the tremendous sources of strength which are his to tap within the executive
branch of the government and his own official family, his power is generally
effective only so long as he does not have to use it.
While a rule of thumb to the effect that a President's authority within his own
branch of the government is good only so long as he does not have to use it is not
always true, it is of sufficient importance in critical official family situations to serve
as a point of departure for this inquiry. Child psychologists who teach psychological
persuasion rather than woodshed practicality are Johnny-come-latelys compared to
generations of Presidents and presidential assistants who have learned the hard
way, that patience and connivance are often better than direct use of the presidential
razor strap in dealing with the executive family.2 In carrying out the President's
job as chief executive, "coordination" is often a much better attitude than "di-
rection." Seldom does the President direct. More often he persuades, sometimes
in person, more frequently through his key assistants. Generally, his so-called
directives, most of them embodied in Executive Orders, are the product of pains-
taking weeks of coordinative effort undertaken by his principal staff assistants among
his executive subordinates in order to achieve a general meeting of minds before
his signature is ever placed upon what in the process has become largely an in-
offensive document.
This is not to suggest that knuckles are not sometimes rapped in the process.
They are, seldom by the President, but almost always by key assistants who exercise
the threat rather than the actuality of presidential power. This leads to the con-
clusion that there is a considerable amount of art mixed up with the science of
running the executive branch of the Government. Effectiveness is much more de-
pendent upon the personal skills of the President and individual top associates than
upon forceful application of presidential authority or on the hierarchy of a formal
organization chart.
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
No President has ever completely avoided the often disastrous reaction against
his administration or against him personally as a result of his direct use of executive
authority as the boss of the executive branch. Franklin D. Roosevelt's ambivalent
settlement of the historic 1943 dispute between Vice President Henry Wallace and
Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones, over handling of the Government's wartime pro-
curement programs abroad, is a Washington legend. In that dramatic executive
action, Mr. Roosevelt fired the Vice President from his job as Chairman of the
Board of Economic Warfare and displaced Secretary Jones as Chairman of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a role that put him in charge of the purse
2 By "executive family" is meant primarily the members of the cabinet and heads of other govern-
ment agencies, plus key staff members in the White House Office and the agencies of the Executive
Office of the President.
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strings that controlled the procurement policy programs developed by Wallace's
organization. Many of the personal wounds suffered in that battle have never
healed. In addition, the administrative headaches resulting from the considerable
number of staff resignations in both agencies following the President's action, created
an administrative crisis that required months to resolve.
As an administrator, Franklin D. Roosevelt was often criticized for his inability
to fire subordinates, for his tendency to solve organizational problems in the
executive branch by permitting an existing official or agency to die on the vine
while he created a parallel entity to take over the functions thus ignored. Duplica-
tions, particularly in the areas of labor, public works, and social welfare, were
common in the organizational fafade of the Roosevelt administration. Oddly, on
closer examination, this "inability" must be counted a real ability on the part of the
Depression and Second World War President frequently to resolve problems by
ignoring them. This was a subconscious recognition of the basic management prin-
ciple that little problems become big problems when an important official recognizes
them and thereby lends them the importance of his personal prestige.
Many teachers of executive management, efficiency experts of the industrial school,
will disapprove the idea of an executive who fails to grasp each problem firmly and
forcefully as it arises. In terms of cold statistical efficiency, in the command de-
cision structure of military organization, in the profit-directed practicality of an
industrial corporation, or in the pragmatic realism of an authoritarian society, resort
to finesse rather than direct action could be a weakness. But the President is
neither a statistic nor a box in an organization chart. His effective strength lies in
his ability to be human and, above all, in his capacity for being President of all
of the people most of the time. Within the framework of American democratic
society, with the President standing alone as a man in a fishbowl, with the Presi-
dent's every word and act capable either of supporting or weakening his administra-
tion, the techniques of compromise and coordination rather than coercion have
special virtues. The very government he commands is founded upon the principles
of the right of men to disagree and the achievement of progress through effective
compromise. His job is to lead, not to demand. Any public official of importance,
the President most of all, must remain persona grata not only to the public, but to
his official associates if he is to retain his ability for leadership.
Franklin D. Roosevelt's ability to beat a strategic political retreat on occasion, his
willingness to accept a partial program rather than a full program in order to
avoid losing an entire objective, represents the master touch in politics. He used
the same technique in his relationships with his official executive branch family, a
subtle mixture of cajolery, coercion, and coordination, seasoned with overtones from
his popular public personality, to keep the gigantic machinery of public administra-
tion moving in a desired direction. Some professional management experts and
students of public administration may quarrel with FDR's techniques as an ad-
ministrator, but they cannot deny results in terms of his ability to survive on the
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rough and tumble political scene, or the enormous impact of the programs born
in his tenure which are now a permanent part of the structure of American govern-
ment.
From the administration of President Harry S. Truman, perhaps the best known
example of the negative results that can stem from direct use of presidential authority
lies in the famous steel industry seizure case of May, 1952. That action provided
a dramatic and practical example of the difference between the "real" authority and
the "legal" authority vested in the President. From the moment the Government
took over supervision of the steel industry in order to avoid a strike deemed dis-
astrous to the Korean War effort, there was no question concerning the President's
practical authority to take over the steel industry and keep it operating under gov-
ernment jurisdiction. The industry was seized, and it stayed seized until the
Supreme Court made a legal determination on June 2, 1952, to the effect that the
President's act of seizing the industry was unconstitutional. 3 The President's efforts
were a sincere attempt to serve the public interest, and no other President has tried
to look more objectively at the public interest or stood more in respect and humility
before it. The net loss to the American system of government in this case lies in
the fact that it did result in a Supreme Court decision placing a specific limitation
upon the powers of the Presidency. The same loss would have resulted had the
Court's decision been to support the President's action, thereby giving the imprimatur
of the Supreme Court to unlimited coercive action by a future President.
Within the framework of the rigid structure of American government, with
elected public officials serving definite and limited terms of office, the ability to
respond effectively to national need and public demand (the two cannot always be
the same) frequently rests only in the flexible powers of the Presidency. When
national emergency demands action and there is no precedent to follow, only the
President can move quickly to avoid crisis. In a practical sense, the power of the Pres-
ident to act in the national interest is limited only by the extent of action that public
opinion permits him to take. Frequently the technique used, rather than the action
taken, is the controlling factor on public opinion. Were we to build up a body of
court decisions that specifically restrict the powers of the President to act in time of
emergency, the value of flexible leadership vested in the office could be lost, with a
corresponding real danger to the survival of the American system of goverment.
President Eisenhower and his new team also learned, and bitterly, the embarrass-
ment inherent in direct exercise of executive authority in the process of the now
famous Dixon-Yates case. When the President permitted himself to become per-
sonally identified with the decision to award the Government's contract for power
needs to the Dixon-Yates combination, the matter became a national issue. Here
was a relatively routine problem which achieved major status because it became
identified with an important-the most important-public official. It can be dem-
onstrated that this use of presidential authority actually cost the Republican Party
'Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952)-
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control of the Senate in the Eighty-fourth Congress. In the months preceding the
1954 congressional elections, neither side had been able to make an issue of the
public power question. Suddenly, the President's Dixon-Yates decision dramatized
the struggle between the public and private power forces. What had been an absent
issue became very much present when accorded the white heat of publicity attendant
upon its personal identification with the President. It is reasonable to conclude that
reaction to the Dixon-Yates decision influenced enough votes in power-conscious
Oregon to swing the narrow margin in favor of the Democratic candidate.
Old experienced hands, with years of seasoning behind them in the White House
or in the Executive Office of the President, were astonished at President Eisenhower's
direct participation in the Dixon-Yates case. It was not the decision itself that was
so unusual, but the fact that the President's administrative team had caused or per-
mitted him to become identified personally with the matter. It could be argued
that given a few months more time, the administration would have been able to
effect sufficient new appointments to both the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority to arrange for the desired decision to be
taken at that lower level without directly involving the President. Here is another
classic example of a case in which full use of the President's personal executive
powers defeated rather than achieved a basic objective of an administration. It was
not the nature of the decision that was so important, but the mere fact that it was
the President who made it.
The above examples, drawn from the last three administrations, cannot be said
to deny the effectiveness of direct use of the President's management authority within
the executive branch in all situations, but they, and many others like them, have
created the atmosphere within which the staff of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent works. Necessarily, the staff acquires an acute awareness of the extreme vul-
nerability to public opinion of both the President and his office. A protective attitude
toward both is the inevitable result. Staffs seek to effectuate management de-
cisions, whenever possible, at levels short of the President himself. This technique
has the double advantage of keeping him out of controversial situations and also
reducing demands upon his time. When actual use of the President's personal
authority becomes unavoidable, the objective is to make every effort to insure that
his signature is placed only on documents that represent completed staff work,
implying that areas of potential conflict have been resolved.
The staff job of the Executive Office agencies, while largely one of coordination
between the office of the Presidency and the key officials of the executive departments
and agencies who are his subordinates, also frequently involves a careful sounding of
public or political reaction in advance of presidential action. But the objectives of
this study are limited to the management of the executive branch and do not
include the political or public relations aspects of his office.
ORGANIZATION DIFFERENCES IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Technically, as a brief glance at the appropriate pages in any recent Con-
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gresional Directory will show,4 the Executive Office of the President includes every-
thing and everyone attached to the Presidency other than the President himself and
his Army, Navy, and Air Force Aides.5 Thus, the White House Office per se is a
part of the Executive Office. In practice, however, official Washington-the Con-
gress, the executive departments and agencies, the press-draws a rather clear line of
distinction between the White House Office and the rest of the agencies that comprise
the Executive Office. While organizational fact does not make such a distinction,
operational practice has led to an unofficial reality in which there are essentially two
recognized organization entities serving the President: the White House staff and
the Executive Office of the President.
Traditionally, the agencies of the Executive Office-for example, the current
Bureau of the Budget, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Council of Economic
Advisers, and several now nonexistent agencies -- have each had a single head. This
single-executive organizational structure, providing one official through whom com-
munications are maintained with the President, lends itself to the "agency concept"
of such bodies. Such organization stands in contrast with the traditional structure
of the White House Office, within which each key member has functioned normally
on an informal basis of direct relationship with the President. This character of
relationship within the White House Office and the Executive Office was common
to both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Senior status accrued to certain
individuals whose higher rank was generally recognized, but for all intents and
purposes, the White House Office functioned as a group of senior staff assistants who
had direct access to, and operated directly through, the person of the President
himself.
The Eisenhower administration, through conversion of the top White House
position, The Assistant to the President,7 to that of a chief of staff, has brought
about more of an "agency" status to the White House Office than has characterized
that body in the past. In any organization, public or private, the group closest to
the top executive evolves in a schematic pattern that most fits the wishes and
past administrative experience of the man at the top. President Eisenhower's mili-
tary background undoubtedly accounts for the creation of the chief of staff approach
to operation of the White House Office. Whether this change in organization con-
tinues in the future depends entirely, of course, upon the preferences and the
personality of the next incumbent of the Presidency.
The difference between the White House Office and the Executive Office of
'For instance, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 379-83 (1956).
'The White House Residence staff is not included.
'Among the no-longer-existing agencies: National Security Resources Board, National Resources
Planning Board, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, and the Office for Emergency Management.
'The position of "The Assistant to the President" came into being formally under President Truman
and was occupied throughout his terms of office by Dr. John R. Steelman. Essentially, the position is the
outgrowth of assignments made to the succession of Directors of the Office of War Mobilization, later
the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, James F. Byrnes, Fred Vinson, John W. Snyder,
and John R. Steelman.
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the President assumes some degree of geographical confirmation in the sense that
their offices are physically separated. During the Truman administration, the old
State-War-Navy Building, directly across West Executive Avenue from the west wing
of the White House, was renamed the Executive Office Building and taken over to
house the Executive Office agencies. Actually, several members of the White House
Office are located in the latter building, but the assumption within Washington
bureaucracy is that such officials are "camping out" simply because there is not
enough room to provide them with suitable offices in either the west or the east
wings of the White House itself.8
The President's White House Office staff-n-The Assistant to the President, his
chief counsel, his appointments, press and correspondence secretaries, his legislative
aide, the cabinet secretary, the six anonymous administrative assistants to the Presi-
dent, and other high ranking special assistants-is identified both with the President
as an individual and with the office of the President as an organizational entity.
With infrequent exceptions, it is from this staff that key officials are selected to
accompany the President on his travels, both business and vacation. When members
of the White House staff speak publicly, they do so only as spokesmen for the Presi-
dent, not in terms of their personal positions. Veteran members of the White
House press corps recognize this close association with the person of the President
and generally accord members of the White House Office immunity from direct
quotation in the press. The fact of the White House Office staff as a part of the
Presidency receives its highest recognition in the traditional treatment accorded it
by the Congress, which seldom seeks to require members of the President's staff to
testify before congressional committees. Exceptions to this rule are rare.
In contrast, the personnel of the other agencies of the Executive Office of the
President are regarded as staff to the office of the Presidency rather than to the
President personally. This comparison draws a rather fine line, for, as in all
organizations, there are key members of the Executive Office organization who, by
virtue of their competence and their personable qualities in the President's opinion,
achieve a more personal relationship. However, if we are to explore effectively the
role of the Executive Office as a coordinating medium in the operation of the execu-
tive branch of the government, this impersonal characteristic must be seen and
understood. Members of the staffs of agencies in the Executive Office do testify
frequently before congressional committees in terms of their official positions, and in
so doing, they are not regarded as committing the President. They make speeches in
their own right. They are often quoted directly in the press and, in fact, operate
their own press relations staffs apart from the White House press office to handle
official news releases relating to operations of their agencies. Heads of Executive
Office agencies function much as do heads of major government departments or
S For example, W. Averell Harriman, while Special Assistant to President Truman in the White
House, had his offices in the Executive Office Building in conjunction with his headquarters staff for the
Mutual Security Program. Numerous Special Assistants to President Eisenhower have been officed in
the Executive Office Building.
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independent agencies, except that their actions, within the executive branch, are
manifestations supporting or stemming from the authority of the office of the Presi-
dency. From time to time the President may see fit to delegate actual executive
authority over segments of the executive branch to the head of an Executive Office
agency. Such was the case in the creation of the Office of Defense Mobilization
at the time of the Korean War. But the complete control of the President over the
proffer or withdrawal of such authority is never in doubt.
Congressional inroads on the President's right to absolute control over the
appointment of his key staff assistants is the object of frequent expert criticism.'"
Within his White House Office staff, this right has never been questioned. Appoint-
ments are made independently of any senatorial approval. Within the Executive
Office, the reverse is frequently true, for there the heads of staff agencies, albeit part
of the President's official staff organization, are sometimes subjected to senatorial
approval,11 a factor which diminishes the finality of the President's authority over
such subordinates.
Another important difference is the matter of tenure of office in the White House
as contrasted to the Executive Office. Invariably, the top White House staff leaves
when the President goes out of office, most often as of the date of the inauguration
of a new administration, and never later than the period necessary to "assist in the
transition of one administration to the other." While it is customary for heads of
other Executive Office agencies to submit resignations to coincide with the termina-
tion of a presidential term of office, these resignations are not always accepted. Ac-
tually, key members of the staffs of Executive Office agencies, other than the White
House Office, tend to stay on.1 This is a most important factor in the continuity of
government and is a principal ingredient in the growing strength and prestige that
has accrued to Executive Office agencies over the years. It is true that staff mortality
was exceedingly high in the Council of Economic Advisers after January 20, 1953,
but this situation did not apply in the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Defense
Mobilization, or the National Security Council. For the most part, within the
Executive Office, the continuity of interagency coordination, in terms of permanency
' A notable exception to direct presidential authority over the head of an Executive Office agency,
and, for that reason, a direct intervention by the Congress in presidential prerogatives, is the statutory
grant of authority to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget regarding quarterly allocations to the de-
partments and agencies of annual appropriations. See Budget and Accounting Procedures Act, 1950,
64 STAT. 765 (950), 3r U. S. C. § 665 (1952). While a confirmation by the Congress of a previous
Executive Order, the statutory enactment does now prevent the President from altering the assignment.
"Notably the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover
Commission). See the Report entitled "General Management of the Executive Branch," Feb. 1949,
Recommendation No. 3: "The President should not be prevented by statute from reorganizing the
President's Office and from transferring functions and personnel from one part of it to another"; and
Recommendation No. 4: "The head of each staff agency in the President's Office should be appointed
by the President without confirmation by the Senate except the Civil Service Commission." Id. at 15-i6.
"The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization requires senatorial approval. 64 STAT. 8r6
(195o), as amended, 65 STAT. 139 (195), 50 U. S. C. App. § 21 5 3 (b) (1952).
"a For example, James S. Lay, Jr., has been Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
under both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. This continuity is also true for several of the
Assistant Directors in the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Defense Mobilization.
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of tenure for key Executive Office personnel, continued through the shift from the
Truman to the Eisenhower administration. However, under the military staff
concept of the Eisenhower administration, the Executive Office agencies do not play
as weighty a role in the operation of the executive branch as under the Truman
administration. Nevertheless, the expert knowledge and experience of staff are still
there to be tapped as needed.
HisToRY OF THE ExEcunvE OFFIcE
Historically, the Executive Office of the President as a formal organization dates
only from September 1939.?8 Like most formal organizations, rather than being
created, it evolved. This evolution grew out of the growing demands upon the job
of the Presidency, the incredible pyramiding of responsibility of the chief executive
in a modern industrial world in which all aspects of government are constantly
reaching more and more into the lives of individual citizens and further and further
afield into the international political arena. Meanwhile, until 1939, the "executive
suite" at i6oo Pennsylvania Avenue, had not been enlarged to cope with these grow-
ing responsibilities.
The first serious consideration, in modern times, of the problems of managing
the executive branch came in 1921 from the discussions that resulted in the Budget
and Accounting Act of that year.' 4 The great concern at the time was the growing
complexity of the Government's fiscal management problems, a direct result of
expansion in the scope and nature of American government occurring during the
First World War. The 1921 act made two significant contributions to better man-
agement: it created the General Accounting Office, as an agency of the Congress,
to do a post-audit function for the Congress in checking on the performance of the
executive branch, a role never truly filled by that agency; and it set up within
the Department of the Treasury a Bureau of the Budget, with a Director appointed
by and responsible to the President, whose primary function was that of assembling
and codifying the annual budget requests of the many separate agencies so that
the President, as chief executive, could present to the Congress a single admin-
istrative budget. Obviously, the primary concern of the Congress in the 1921 act
was its own convenience, the President's office, per se, receiving little actual attention.
The new budget office in the Treasury was a move in the right direction, for in
the process of providing convenience to the Congress through the submission of a
single coordinated budget, it also provided (not by design) the President with a
management arm through which he could take an advanced and detailed look at
what his ambitious cabinet subordinates were planning to do. But the difference in
governmental tempo between 1921 and 1939, at which time the Executive Office was
actually created, requires some understanding. The memory of a Washington elder
statesman, long prominent in the art and science of public management, helps us in
this regard. He recalls an afternoon spent at the White House on a social call to
1 Reorganization Plan No. I of 1939, 53 STAT. 561 (1939), 5 U. S. C. § 133, 133r, 133t note
(1952), Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C. F. R. 576 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
"Budget and Accounting Act of 192r, 42 STAT. 20 (921), 31 U. S. C. §§ xx-x6 (1952).
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President Coolidge in the latter's second term, when the only official business trans-
acted was for the President to select from a group of recent photographs of his person
those he wanted printed. By the late thirties, President Roosevelt's New Deal, the
war against depression, had so magnified the complexities of executive management
that the President simply did not have time to do many of the important tasks ex-
pected of him. Prior to 1939, the growing demands of the White House for addi-
tional personnel had been met largely through the ruse of borrowing personnel from
the executive departments, which were required to keep such loaned personnel on
their own payrolls. A notable example was the post of Under Secretary of the
Interior, which, by custom, had come to be regarded as the position held by the man
who actually filled the full-time role of the President's chief liaison officer with the
Congress.
The quiet afternoon example cited above from the days of the Coolidge admin-
istration notwithstanding, the complaints of Presidents over the excessive burdens of
their office are not limited to the post-Second World War era.' 5 Two factors com-
bined during the depression years to concentrate attention on the organization of
the President's own office. First, the complex social and economic programs of the
New Deal, which created many new programs and new agencies, with a consequent
increase in the number of officials reporting directly to the President. Second, the
depression, which simultaneously decreased employment opportunities in private
industry and established the federal government as the nation's principal employer,
brought into government ranks many experienced managers from private business.
How best to manage the then dominant executive branch became a favorite Wash-
ington luncheon and dinner conversation topic.
Late in his first term of office, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a
President's Committee on Administrative Management to make a study and to report
to him on the organizational changes required to provide for more effective co-
ordination and direction of the executive branch. The resulting report, 6 submitted
" See President Franklin D. Roosevelt's letter of Jan. 12, 1937, transmitting to Congress the Report
of the President's Committee on Administrative Management: "I am not the first President to report
to the Congress that antiquated machinery stands in the way of effective administration and of adequate
control by the Congress. Theodore Roosevelt, William H. Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Herbert Hoover
made repeated but not wholly successful efforts to deal with the problem." And ". . . they say, what
has been common knowledge for 2o years, that the President cannot adequately handle his responsi-
bilities; that he is overworked; that it is humanly impossible, under the system which we have, for
him to carry out his constitutional duty as Chief Executive, because he is overwhelmed with minor
details and needless contacts arising directly from the bad organization and equipment of the Government.
I can testify to this. With my predecessors who have said the same thing over and over again, I
plead guilty." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENr'S COMMIrrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT [hereinafter
cited BROWNLow REPORT] iii, iv (937).
" BROWNow REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 15. Members of the Committee were: Louis Brownlow,
Chairman, Charles E. Merriam, and Luther Gulick. The Report was submitted to the President on Jan.
8, 1937, transmitted to the Congress five days later, but required nearly two years for fruition of its
principal recommendations regarding reorganization of the President's office, through the medium of the
Reorganization Plan No. I of 1939.
See also Somers, The President as Administrator, 283 ANNALS 104, io6 (1952): "The Committee's
signal contribution was its sharp portrayal of the Presidency as the pivot of federal administration, all
other aspects being secondary."
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to the President and the Congress in January 1937, is one of the most remarkable
public management documents ever written. Called the "Brownlow Report," after
its chairman, Louis J. Brownlow, the document is now out of print, but still serves
as a bible on administrative management in schools of public administration. Less
extensive in its coverage, and now less well known than the more current and
equally outstanding reports of the first Hoover Commission,"7 beginning in 1949,
the Brownlow study limited its attention to the so-called administrative manage-
ment facets of the government-specifically: personnel, fiscal, and planning.
A direct result of the Brownlow study was the creation of the Executive Office
of the President, providing, for the first time, a comprehensive organizational
framework within which staff could be provided on a flexible basis to augment the
growing demands of the President's job. At the outset, the Office included the
Bureau of the Budget by transfer from the Treasury Department, the National
Resources Planning Board, and an enlarged White House staff. Also, at this time,
1939, the six Administrative Assistants to the President positions were created,18 to be
filled, as FDR liked to phrase it, "by young men of great competence with a passion
for anonymity." Time has proven that actual anonymity in the White House staff
is a rare virtue, but the value of this additional and continuing staff assistance to the
President has been proven again and again in the seventeen years these posts have
been in existence. Less prominent today than during the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations, the six Administrative Assistants to the President have tended to
become submerged in what has become the largest White House staff ever assembled.
While filled from time to time by professionals with specialized assignments, 0 for
the most part, the "anonymity boys" have been general staff men who filled a variety
of assignments as the President's problems demanded. Specialization in these posts
has tended to follow a grouping of responsibilities for relationships with certain
areas of governmental programs rather than in terms of the pre-service technical
specialty of the appointee himself.
THE INCREASING SIZE OF TIE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
The growth in size of the White House Office between the Truman and the
Eisenhower administration presents a remarkable example of how the organization
around the President tends to evolve haphazardly out of need rather than in accord-
ance with any predetermined plan. In March i95i , at the peak of the Korean
War emergency, the Congressional Directory listed only fourteen names and posi-
tions deemed to be of sufficient prominence in the White House Office to have such
publication.20 The latest Directory, January 1956, lists no less than thirty-nine, almost
" Reference is here made to the REPoR'rs op "rSE FIRST ColmifSsiON o- REoROAN1ZATMON OF THE
ExEcUTnvE BRANCH OF T E GOVERNMENT (949).
"The idea for the six Administrative Assistants to the President stems from the BROWNLOW REPORT,
op. dt. supra note x5, at 5.
" For example, Gabriel Hauge, economic adviser to President Eisenhower, currently fills one of the
Administrative Assistant positions.
-" Congressional Directory, Mar. r95I, pp. 337-38.
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three times the Truman total.2  Other than his regular staff, in 1951 President
Truman had only one Special Assistant, W. Averell Harriman, who, in addition
to his responsibilities as head of the mutual security program, also served the Presi-
dent as a Special Assistant over a broad range of foreign economic matters.
There are now seven Special Assistants to the President.2 2 This is an item of
fundamental importance in Executive Office organization, for appointments of this
rank invariably result from gaps in the cabinet approach to administration which
require creation of super-administrators who can operate for the President at a level
that involves the normal responsibilities of two or more of the heads of the regular
departments or agencies. The conclusion is rather obvious-the size of the White
House and Executive Office staffs and, above all, the rank of White House staff mem-
bers, grows in direct relationship to the inability of the more rigid cabinet system
to meet growing complexities in the management of governmental programs. The
White House staff now comes closer to governing the country than ever before.
While the Eisenhower administration has more presidential attaches of super
rank than ever before, and while they seem to stay in their positions longer, perhaps
the most powerful Executive Office post was the creation of President Truman.
This was the appointment of a Director of Defense Mobilization, as head of the
Office of Defense Mobilization, a temporary emergency action in December i95o,
resulting from the need for an immediate presidential deputy of cabinet rank to
control, for the President, the many departments and agencies involved in the
Korean mobilization effort 3 The position continues, but the nature of the job has
changed, as we shall note later. Meantime, the Director of Defense Mobilization is
not a member of the White House staff. He is an agency executive in his own
right and heads a separate organization within the framework of the Executive
Office of the President. His direct staff relationship to the President notwithstanding,
the Director of Defense Mobilization is not regarded in Washington governmental
folklore as being "White House." The Congress and the press treat him much as
they would the head of any other independent governmental department or agency.
The rapid growth of the White House staff under President Eisenhower is
particularly interesting because it has resulted in contradiction of a pre-inauguration
commitment to return to constitutional cabinet government and eliminate the coterie
around the President.2 4 Perhaps no administration has ever come into office with
a greater consciousness of management in all of its scientific ramifications. The
command-decision military background of the President, with its undertones of
general staff organization, combined with the "executive suite" background of many
of the key officials in a businessman's administration, make this possible. There is
little question but that the administration was sincere in its intention to make govern-
"5 Id,. Jan. 1956, pp. 379-82. 22 d. at 381.
"
2 Exec. Order No. 10193, 3 C. F. R. 156 (195o Supp.).
" See ROBERT J. DoNovN, EISErHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY 65 (1956): "President Eisenhower
applies greater formality of procedure in the Cabinet than has been adhered to in the past." Actually,
Donovan's book devotes very little attention to the internal operations of the staff around the President.
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ment more efficient by emphasizing a return to autonomous cabinet executives and
eliminating the White House gang. It is to their credit, perhaps, that a few years
in office have taught them that this cannot be done. The end result has been the
appointment of super-executives at the White House level, of adequate prestige per-
sonally and position officially to permit them to intervene authoritatively in matters
involving even members of the cabinet.
COMPETITION IN THE CABINET STRUCTURE
Contrary to the neatly stereotyped symmetrical outlines in the organization of the
executive branch of the government contained in high school Civics books, the
executive branch is not one big happy family. It never has been such under any
President. It is too big, too complex, and too human ever to be anything but
a fractious free-for-all. This would seem to be a perfectly normal situation, however,
in a democratic society which justly prides itself on the promotion of independent
thought and seeks to progress through the processes of compromise. Washington's
governmental halls are lined with the ghosts of cabinet officers who have come into
office with a determination to create efficiency by cutting down both on personnel
and on program, only to depart at the end of their terms leaving a bigger and more
complex department than they inherited in the first place. With expenditures for
nondefense programs now higher for the federal budget in 1957215 than ever before,
this situation continues under the present administration and seems to prove that
the trend to bigger government has no relationship to the political party that
happens to be in control of the executive branch.
Cabinet officers have special interests to serve within the framework of bureau-
cracy itself. Some, like the Secretaries of Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, and In-
terior have a vast political constituency of their own, inside and outside the Govern-
ment. Any cabinet officer is at least in part a prisoner of his job. His effectiveness
depends not so much upon what he gives his staff as what his staff gives him. The
average cabinet official comes to his job with a conception of his relationships that
regards his ties to the President as primary, his ties to his department as secondary.
Essentially, the natural reaction is to regard himself as a part of the President farmed
out to hold jurisdiction over a specific segment of the executive branch. Neither
Republicans nor Democrats in cabinet jobs differ in the speed with which this
concept is quickly changed. The Secretary becomes most often a pleader for a spe-
cific cause.
A minor case illustrates the situation quite well. In 1949, the National Security
Resources Board, a. part of the Executive Office, had a quarter of a million dollars to
allocate to the established departments and agencies for preparation of a compre-
hensive series of raw material and industrial facility studies that could serve as a
basic encyclopedia of statistical data for future mobilization planning projects. Since
1949, a recession period, was also a year in which both the administration and the
25For a more detailed discussion, see Kreager, The Federal Budget for 1957, 13 ILL. Bus. REV. 6
(z956).
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Congress were seeking to cut government expenditures, largely, as is usual, through
personnel reductions in the executive agencies, a vast amount of interdepartmental
competition ensued. For any department, capture of a part of the NSRB funds,
small as they were, insured retention of some staff at least until a next and possibly
more lenient year. For a study of copper, no less than four agencies, Commerce, the
Tariff Commission, and two agencies of the Interior Department, competed. This
was a problem for Execuiive Office adjudication, for cabinet officers, plagued as they
are by loyalties to their own departments, are in no position to compromise their
interests without losing face among their subordinates. At the same time, intense
rivalry resulted between Commerce and Interior as to which should do the six studies
related to the steel industry. The result was an Executive Office engineered compro-
mise, now generally regarded as controlling, to the effect that Interior is responsible
for steel from the iron mine to the production of pig iron, but once pig metal
enters the picture, the Commerce Department takes over. This seems a simple
enough problem to the uninitiated, but actually it is a very troublesome one in the
internal operation of the executive branch. To assume that the President himself
would have the time to resolve such a minor jurisdictional problem, allowing for the
time that would be required for him to become thoroughly informed as to both sides
of the argument, would be absurd. The settlement was worked out at staff level in
the National Security Resources Board, an Executive Office agency.
The solution to such daily operational problems is not as simple as the above
brief narrative would suggest. The mere existence of an Executive Office agency
is not enough in itself automatically to produce decisions that permit the wheels of
administration to move. The decisions are the product of a coordination process
in which the prestige of every agency and every official involved is protected, if
possible, and the imprimatur of presidential authority is used only as an implied
threat hovering in the background of the Executive Office agency's manipulations.
The basic ingredient is system. The NSRB, technically headed by a seven-man
cabinet-level board, with a chairman who also served as the full-time head of the
agency, was in no position to compromise interagency problems at the Board level.
Early experience had proven that a cabinet-level board, like the cabinet itself, is not
a medium through which decisions can be made; but it also proved that such a
group can serve as an effective medium through which, by careful attention to the
niceties of official protocol, an executive close to the President and in the difficult
position of calling his shots among his nominal superiors, can maintain good per-
sonal and official relationships with those key officials. As is normal in any govern-
mental organization, below the board level the NSRB senior staff formed inter-
agency liaison relationships, based on the principle that a good staff man can keep
his boss well advised only if he knows what other bosses of similar level are think-
ing about, struggling with, and planning or hoping to do. This mutually dependent
interagency staff relationship is a common thing, and a healthy thing, for with-
out it, much of the continuity and coordination required to keep a vast governmental
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structure functioning smoothly could not be accomplished. Sometimes it even
becomes desirable to formalize, openly, this type of mutually dependent interagency
staff relationship.26
Logic can be applied to the compromise of a competitive bureaucratic situation
when the "face" of the negotiators is not involved. An informal NSRB inter-
departmental staff group actually worked out the solution to the competitive struggle
over the materials surveys, which put their bosses in the position of accepting a staff
recommendation, thereby protecting them from the necessity of making an original
policy determination that could prejudice their position in their own organizations.
Obviously, even the coordination process requires a focal point or a spearhead.
Only the staff of the President (the Executive Office) can provide this, for that staff
enjoys the peculiar advantage of operating under the cloak of the boss who is the boss
of everybody else's boss. Sometimes heads fall or pressure is applied, but more often
the time worn adage of good staff organization prevails-reasonable men, reasonably
assembled, can usually reach reasonable solutions to legitimate problems.
While the President's job requires him to tackle daily the world's toughest man-
agement assignment, the very nature of his responsibility demands that he provide
broad positive leadership toward over-all national objectives. Before he can make
a policy decision, he must have adequate and continuing information covering all
major facets of the situation facing him. Cabinet members and agency heads, by
virtue of their specific and limited responsibilities, cannot make these broad deter-
minations. It is from the cabinet and agency heads that the President must expect
to receive the varied and often conflicting recommendations which need to be care-
fully sifted and balanced off against the administration's national or international
objectives before a decision can be made. No board (e.g., cabinet in this case) can
make decisions in the face of intramembership conflicts of jurisdiction, when the
man in the chair controls the board rather than the board controlling the chair. It
is naive to assume otherwise.
Then who does the sifting? There are occasions in which a cabinet officer can
perform this task. For example, President Truman assigned to Secretary of Com-
merce Charles Sawyer the task of being the administration spokesman on the St.
Lawrence waterway project, and the Secretary and his staff to a large extent did
the sifting on interagency relationships to that assignment. But most of the time,
the sifting is done for the President within the framework of his own White House
Staff or Executive Office.
The President needs advice and guidance on matters of national policy from every
possible angle of public importance. His staff normally is organized to do this.
There is always at least one, generally the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, who
must look at a proposal with the cold hard facts of cost constantly before him. It is
not his job to judge political implications or impact upon foreign or domestic policy.
Another, currently the Director of Defense Mobilization, should be concerned not
O The interagency senior staff of the National Security Council is a good example.
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at all with cost, but always with the implications for national security, economic and
military, uppermost in his mind. A third source, the National Security Council, may
be equally concerned with national security but primarily from the approach that
thinks in terms of the hard statistical facts of military supremacy rather than the
more elusive factors of domestic economic well-being. The latter is the province of
the Council of Economic Advisers. Another may look at a policy proposal from
the standpoint of impact on government organization. Ofttimes, the President is his
own political adviser, but he may call in his political party national chairman to
help weigh the political implications inherent in a variety of possible decisions
and their probable impact on the voting public in a forthcoming election. More
often than not, personality factors within the executive family itself have to be
considered. Any decision a President might make involving jurisdictional assign-
ments in the management of natural resources, for example, would be sure to please
and displease simultaneously one or more of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior,
and Commerce, and possibly several of the regulatory agencies. A too-quick decision
by a President can make a cabinet position untenable to an incumbent, and a resig-
nation might follow, creating embarrassment to the administration. If anyone, any-
where, knows that it is impossible to please everyone all the time, even within the
official executive family of the United States Government, it is the President.
Sometimes the sifters themselves have to be sifted, and the Assistant to the
President or the President's chief counsel frequently fills this role. Other times, the
President may call in a personal friend for unofficial advice on a particular problem.
At times, special presidential advisory boards, complete with official certificates of
presidential appointment, may be set up on a continuing basis to provide a forum
wherein policy problems can be worked over from all angles, not for decision pur-
poses, but just to insure that no significant aspect is overlooked. President Truman
created his National Advisory Board on Mobilization Policy, a highly controversial
bipartisan body composed of labor, industry, agriculture, and "public" members, just
for this purpose.2 7  President Eisenhower has made even more frequent use of the
public-advisory-board technique to keep the sifting process a little farther away from
the President's office and to insure more comprehensive consideration of all possible
angles of public interest. Such presidential advisory boards are serviced, staff-wise,
from the ranks of the Executive Office agencies.
Sometimes temporary Executive Office agencies are created to provide an inter-
vening level for settlement of disputes, to keep such adjudication processes away
from the President and his chief assistants, or at least to hold them up long enough
to permit resolution of the problem at a higher level. At the time the Office of
Defense Mobilization was created, to which was assigned jurisdiction over both
the emergency production control and emergency stabilization control programs, the
Economic Stabilization Agency was used for this specific purpose. It provided an
intermediate level between the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabiliza-
7 Exec. Order No. 10224, 3 C. F. R. 418 (i951 Supp.)
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don Board, on the one hand, and the President and the Director of Defense Mobiliza-
tion on the other. As a result, appeals from decisions of the wage and price operating
agencies were handled by the Economic Stabilizer, and only appeals from his de-
cisions were allowed to crowd the time of the Defense Mobilizer. Thus, the Presi-
dent became involved only as a final court of appeal on issues of outstanding im-
portance.
But no one, absolutely no one but the President himself, can make the final
decision on matters of basic policy, either as to substance or organization structure.
In the current enthusiasm for relieving the President of some of the burdens of his
office, this fact is too often overlooked. It would be wrong to imply that any degree
of effectiveness in the organization and functioning of the President's staff could
free him from the tasks of the ultimate responsibility vested in his office. Any de-
cision made by a subordinate in the executive branch, even under the clearest possible
delegation of authority from the President, is always subject to appeal and review
by the President if it goes awry. His staff can only assist him in approaching the
problem; they cannot remove from his shoulders the weight of his final responsibility.
THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
The evolution of the powers and authority of the Director of Defense Mobiliza-
tion offers a case example of how the Executive Office structure permits flexibility to
meet an administrative need. In December 195 o, when President Truman signed
the Executive Order creating the Office of Defense Mobilization, he handed to the
new Director, Charles E. Wilson,2 s the broadest grant of power ever held by anyone
other than the President himselff. Possibly no other legal act of either the Congress
or the President ever came so close to the actual creation of an Assistant President.
Mr. Wilson held in his hands the authority that literally gave him jurisdiction over
the entire enomomy of the nation, subject only to the President's power of approval
or right to withdraw the grant of authority.
Existence of such broad overriding operational authority within the person of an
agency head in the Executive Office of the President violates the tradition that the
Executive Office coordinates rather than commands. However, the fact that this
can be done in an emergency suggests the convenience that the Executive Office
structure lends to a President when necessity demands that he delegate some of his
problems and authority and finds himself in a position where the inter-departmental
nature of such problems makes it impractical to delegate them to a single cabinet
head. Unfortunately, the appearance of a "czar" in the midst of the President's own
staff agencies does create problems of conflict among his own staff. As a result,
White House staff members may find themselves acting as a buffer between the
President and a "czar" on his own staff. As a matter of practice, however, delegation
2sThe reference is to Charles Edward Wilson, at the time President of the General Electric Company,
and the former Executive Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board during World War II.
"
9 Exec. Order No. 10193, 3 C. F. R. 156 (s95o Supp.). Based on authority granted the President
under the Defense Production Act of 195o, 64 STAT. 798 (195o), 5o U. S. C. App. §§ 2o6i-66 (1952).
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of overriding operational authority, openly and without reservation other than
appeal to the President himself, is a temporary expedient used only in periods of
emergency.
The justification for the unusual delegation of authority to the Defense Mobilizer
grew out of compounding emergency problems: a hot war in Korea that threatened
to become hotter, the realization that the United States had become committed in-
definitely to world leadership in a long cold-war against the spread of Communism,
and the hard fact that the economy of the country had to be rebuilt on a mobiliza-
tion basis that would permit this democracy to exist on a semiwar footing for an
indefinite period of years. Serious shortages in critical and strategic raw materials,
actual inadequacies in vast areas of industrial production facilities, imbalances in the
nation's economic system that required governmental imposition of direct and in-
direct stablization controls, lags in production of military end items, all combined
to emphasize the temporary need for a mobilization "czar" who could move rapidly
and decisively to redirect the country's production machinery and, at the same time,
handle the inevitable organizational conflicts that would result in the bureaucratic
structure of the government itself.
On March 31, 1952, when Mr. Wilson resigned and returned to private life,
sufficient improvement in the critical economic problems related to the mobilization
effort had been achieved to permit some relaxation in the dominant role of the
Office of Defense Mobilization. In the late spring and summer of 1952, the Assistant
to the President, Dr. John R. Steelman, doubled in brass as Acting Mobilizer during
a time in which emphasis began to shift from a build-up of controls to the develop-
ment of an orderly approach to the removal of controls. This process was continued
during the final months of the Truman administration by Mobilizer Henry H.
Fowler and reached actual decontrol in many items in the spring of 1953 after
the Republicans came in.
The present director of Defense Mobilization, Arthur S. Flemming, who took
over after inauguration day, has completed the transition of ODM from an operating
command agency to a staff agency. Dr. Flemming has conceived his role as Defense
Mobilizer as being that of the President's chief staff assistant for the coordination
of the mobilization activities of the various departments and agencies, an approach
that fits neatly into the current administration's general staff ideas for running the
President's Office. The transition from a super-agency, with powers to direct and
control, to a staff agency functioning in the medium of coordination was completed
in April 1953, when the operating production agency, Defense Production Ad-
ministration, and the permanent planning agency, the National Security Resources
Board, were consolidated into the Office of Defense Mobilization, which became a
permanent entity within the framework of the Executive Office of the President."0
ODM retains certain important policy authority within the economic mobilization
"°Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, 63 STAT. 203, 5 U. S. C. § 1332 (1952). 3 C. F. R. X34
(953 Supp.).
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sphere, but it now operates primarily to codify and coordinate the recommenda-
tions and determinations of the departments most involved in the operation of the
mobilization program, principally the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and In-
terior. While there are those who would like a more aggressive point of mobiliza-
tion control short of the President, the transition of this Executive Office agency
from a command to a staff role has been a normal process, resulting from the con-
stant procedure of adjusting organization to public need. In this process, changes
have been influenced probably very little by the politics inherent in the shift from
the administration of one major party to that of the other.
A major organizational problem in post-war mobilization, starting with the
original National Security Resources Board in 1947 and running through to the
present Office of Defense Mobilization, has been the complication of mixing the
cabinet into the functions of the President's own Executive Office staff. In creating
the National Security Resources Board, the Congress provided for the appointment,
by the President, of a board per se. This has been a cabinet-level board from
the beginning 3' The mixing of cabinet members, semiautonomous heads of execu-
tive departments in their own right, and advisers to the President in their specialized
areas of responsibility, into the operation of an Executive Office agency has worked
badly from the start. The original Board, including in its membership some cab-
inet members of great experience in actual mobilization operations during the
Second World War, 2 moved to intervene in the operation of the Board's staff organi-
zation from the beginning. They were resisted by both the President and his staff.
The President's position prevailed, and the Board per se, later transferred intact as
the Defense Mobilization Board after the creation of the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion, became, primarily, an informal high-level medium through which the Chair-
man (NSRB) or the Director (ODM) could maintain effective liaison with top
government officials, who enjoyed, for the most part, closer official relationships with
the President than they did. Under Truman, this cabinet-level Board, superimposed
on an Executive Office agency created in large part to coordinate cabinet officers,
never became a decision making body. From time to time it made recommenda-
tions to the President, but the latter always made his own decisions.
Under Eisenhower, the position of the Defense Mobilization Board changed ab-
ruptly. Overnight it became an actual, decision making body, if not by charter, then
certainly in fact, for a DMB recommendation to the President now invariably re-
ceives presidential approval. This intrusion of the cabinet into the functions of what
would normally be presidential staff tends to reduce the prestige and effectiveness of
" The National Security Resources Board was created under Sec. 03, National Security Act of 1947,
6I STAT. 499 (1947), as amended, 64 STAT. 1280 (1950). 50 U. S. C. App. § 404 (1952). Regular
membership on the National Security Resources Board, per se, and its successor, the Defense Mobiliza-
tion Board, has included the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, plus the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
" Particularly Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug, who,
as Secretary of the Navy and War Production Board Chairman, respectively, during World War II, be.
came acknowledged experts in the finer details of mobilization programming.
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the agency as a personal arm of the President and cuts down on the number of
effective eyes and ears he has available to help him. The development in respect
to the Defense Mobilization Board is a manifestation of the current administration's
desire to return governmental power to the cabinet level, a fact not entirely con-
tradicted by the creation of the largest super-staff at the White House level ever
assembled. The situation becomes one of a cabinet taking over the President's
regular staff, but in turn being superseded on many matters by a super-general
staff at the White House level.
THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
The agency whose functions and operations lend themselves best to an under-
standing of the staff nature of the Executive Office of the President as an admin-
strative coordinator is the Bureau of the Budget. As previously noted, it was the
transfer of the Bureau from the Treasury to the White House in 1939 that marked
the formal beginning of the Executive Office of the President as we know it today.
Originally set up to do a budget review and codification job, the Budget Bureau
has become, in fact, the chief staff arm of the President in the management of the
executive branch.33 The budgetary process is the sole medium through which the
multitude of governmental activities and program and the agencies they support
can be reviewed annually in their entirety and in relationship to a coordinated pro-
gram for the promotion of the welfare and security of the nation and its people.
The federal budgetary process is now said to occupy fifteen months out of each
year, a figure of speech used to illustrate the fact that completion of the budget for
one given fiscal year often overlaps by several months the beginning of the process
for the budget to apply in the ensuing year. With federal expenditures now a
major sustaining factor in the economy of the nation, and a basic ingredient in the
management of the economy of the country, the budget becomes a key factor in the
determination of all fiscal policies. Broad policy or program statements in even
such important documents as the President's State of the Union Message or Eco-
nomic Message are one thing, but the dollars and cents figures in the budget are
another as far as proving the actual extent to which such statements of policy may
see realization in practice.
Since the presentation of the budget requires detailed examination into the
programs and organization of every government department and agency, the
Bureau has acquired important management and organization staff functions.
Through its statistical standards staff, it exerts control over the assignment and nature
of the multitude of publications issued by federal agencies, and reduces duplication
and conflicts between the agencies as to the content of publications and the staff re-
quired to produce them. Through its legislative reference service, it becomes the
focal point within the executive branch for the review of bills pending before the
"The most recent comprehensive treatment of the Bureau of the Budget will be found in ARTHUR
SMITHIES, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS vN THE UNITED STATES particularly cc. II, IV, V, VIII, and X(1955).
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Congress and for the assembly and submission of a unified administration position on
such bills. This little-publicized feature of the Bureau of the Budget is perhaps the
single most important ingredient in a unified approach by the executive branch
agencies to matters pending before the legislature. Without it, the President would
be hard put to keep up with the ideas generated by the hierarchy he normally is
supposed to command.
The greatest asset to the Bureau of the Budget, however, has been its personnel.
Over the years, it has acquired an unusually competent staff of specialists who repre-
sent, in the combination of all their fields of specialization, a comprehensive knowl-
edge of the vast ramifications of the federal government. This continuing compe-
tence in the knowledge of day-to-day government operations is available for each
succeeding President to tap. Not the least among attractions that have lured able
young men into the Bureau is that it offers one of the best stepping stones to advance-
ment in a professional public service career. Many a budget review officer has
moved out into a top executive position in one of the agencies he has been handling
on a staff budget assignment.
In less than twenty years, the Bureau has become an effective comptrollership
operation, not unlike those common to effective management in big private industry.
During the Truman administration, the Budget Director had regular daily access to
the President and kept him constantly posted on the internal administrative man-
agement of the executive branch. Simultaneously, key Budget Bureau staff mem-
bers worked in staff harness with specialists in the White House office. The rela-
tionship was continuous, professional in character, and personally informal.
The end result of the growth of the Bureau of the Budget was that it acquired
not only enormous prestige within the ranks of government, but also exerted a vast
amount of power-power of the most fundamental sort, control over the availability
of funds to develop programs and to employ people. For this reason, its popularity
has never paralleled its prestige or its power, but this does not in any way lessen
its effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this inquiry into the role of the Executive Office of the
President, a careful distinction was drawn between the status of the White House
Office and that of the other Executive Office agencies. The nature of the differ-
ences has been further altered by the changes in organizational emphasis between
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The small Truman White House staff
was balanced by a more extensive delegation of responsibility to other Executive
Office agencies. At present, the application of the military general staff concept to
the structure of the President's White House organization has resulted in a very
large White House staff which has tended to remove from the permanent Executive
Office agencies some of the influence and effectiveness they previously enjoyed. A
case in point is the Bureau of the Budget. Long the dominant point of influence
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in the control over the preparation of expenditure estimates, it actually influenced
very little the final budget figures for the federal budget for 1957. The point of
control had shifted across the street to the general staff in the White House. Sim-
ilarly, influence once exercised in the Office of Defense Mobilization has shifted to
points of origin in Defense, Commerce, Interior and other agenciesO4
Space limitations do not permit detailed examination of the role of the National
Security Council, itself a coordinating medium for the agencies and officials most
involved in national defense on the military and diplomatic fields, or of the Council
of Economic Advisers, a staff and advisory agency in the strictest sense.
Even after twenty years of concentrated attention on the organization of the
President's office and its staff components and the role of that staff in the manage-
ment of the executive branch, management technicians have only just begun the
study of that tremendously important segment of our public administration structure.
So long as Presidents and the public in general are concerned over the excessive
burdens imposed upon the occupant of the world's toughest job, so long shall we
continue to try to improve the situation by additions and changes in the staff
organization that surrounds him. Since Presidents are, after all, human beings, and
thus subject to the variations in personality and skills that are usual to all members
of the human race, then the most important consideration in organizing the Execu-
tive Office or carrying out its mission is to keep it flexible. Flexibility is necessary
to adjust to the personality of individual Presidents, to adapt organization to the
urgencies of a constant parade of government problems and new public responsi-
bilities, and to insure continuity in staff around the highest point of governmental
leadership-which point must arbitrarily be changed from time to time under the
dictates of our political system.
The White House Office and the Executive Office, as organizations, do not lend
themselves to precision organization planning. If such were true, then only one
President in the history of the United States could have been right-and you take
your choice. The personality of each President, and the political, economic, and
social demands of his term of office, will combine to dictate the structure and char-
acter of the group around him that assists him, minute by minute, in carrying out
the overwhelming burdens of his office. To date, we must admit, even allowing for
continuing faults, that flexibility has prevailed and that organizational structure
through all its changes, has at least satisfied the desires, if not the needs, of each
President-and who better has the right to determine what his needs shall be?
"This discussion of the role of the Executive Office of the President has not been intended as an
inquiry into the faults or virtues of any particular administration in the operation of the President's
own staff organization. Rather, it has been intended as an examination of the organizational climate
within which the Executive Office must function, and the demands and motivations that limit or guide
its actions-as a unit and as individuals within that unit.
